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Abstract 
This study investigates the determinants of Chinese outward direct investment (ODI) and the 
extent to which three special explanations (capital market imperfections, special ownership 
advantages and institutional factors) need to be nested within the general theory of the 
multinational firm. We test our hypotheses using official Chinese ODI data collected between 
1984 and 2001. We find Chinese ODI to be associated with high levels of political risk in, and 
cultural proximity to, host countries throughout, and with host market size and geographic 
proximity (1984 to 1991) and host natural resources endowments (1992 to 2001). We find 
strong support for the argument that aspects of the special theory help to explain the 




This paper investigates the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) by Chinese 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) over the period 1984 to 2001.1  The process of China’s 
deepening re-integration with the global economy began, in the modern era, with the ‘Open 
Door’ policies of the late 1970s and accelerated with accession to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in 2001. Studies of this process generally examine China in terms of its 
position in global trade flows (e.g. Lall and Albaladejo, 2004); its comparative advantage as a 
manufacturing location (e.g. Chen et al., 2002; Rowen, 2003); and in the volume, distribution 
                                                          
1 In this paper, we take the standard UNCTAD definition of FDI as being an investment involving a long-term 
relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control by a firm in an enterprise resident in a foreign country 
(UNCTAD, 2005). FDI normally has three components: (i) equity capital (the purchase of shares in the foreign 
enterprise); (ii) reinvested earnings (those earnings not distributed as dividends by foreign affiliates or remitted 
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and impacts of inbound FDI (e.g. Buckley, et al., 2002; Buckley, 2004b). 2  In contrast, 
understanding of a further dimension to this process: namely, the rise in Chinese outward 
direct investment (ODI), remains very incomplete. One reason is the paucity of sufficiently 
disaggregated data to permit formal analysis of the forces shaping Chinese ODI. The result 
has been a preponderance of descriptive research on FDI trends (e.g. Buckley et al., 2006; 
Deng, 2003, 2004; Taylor, 2002; Wong and Chan, 2003) coupled with in-depth case studies 
on a small number of high-profile Chinese MNEs (e.g. Liu and Li, 2002; Warner et al., 2004).  
Using official data from one of the key agencies concerned with China’s investment 
approval process, the State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE), this exploratory 
study is, to our knowledge, one of the first to model formally the forces driving Chinese ODI. 
Our focus is on FDI determinants and the extent to which established theoretical explanations 
of the MNE (much of which concentrates on industrialised country, and especially US, 
investors) can explain FDI from an emerging economy like China. China is a particularly 
good test case for the general theory of FDI as it presents many special conditions which are 
rarely encountered in a single country.  
Several indicators point to a strengthening of China’s role as an investor country in 
recent years. By 2004, China was the eighth most important FDI source among developing 
countries, behind economically more advanced economies such as Hong Kong SAR (Special 
Administrative Region), South Korea, Republic of China (Taiwan) and Singapore (UNCTAD, 
2005a). A recent survey of national investment promotion agencies predicts that China will 
become a top four source country of FDI over the period 2005 to 2008 (UNCTAD, 2005b), 
with African and Asia-Pacific country agencies in particular highlighting the dominant role 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
to the investor enterprise) and (iii) intra-company loans or debt transactions (borrowing and lending between 
parent and foreign affiliate enterprises) (UNCTAD, 2005). 
2  In this study, the terms China and Mainland China are used interchangeably to refer to the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC). For our purposes, the PRC excludes the special autonomous regions of Hong Kong and Macau, 
unless specifically stated. The Republic of China (Taiwan) is treated as a separate economy. Regions with 
disputed borders (e.g. the Spratly Islands) are excluded from our definition of the PRC. 
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expected of China, placing it second only to South Africa and the USA in each region 
respectively. There is every indication that China will contribute increasingly to global FDI 
flows over the coming years. These indicators highlight the timeliness of this study. 
Chinese outward investors can be regarded as being state-owned in the period under 
study, since private firms were legally prohibited from investing abroad prior to 2003. Since 
1979, when ODI was formally permitted under the ‘Open Door’ policies, the 
internationalisation of Chinese firms has been tightly controlled by national and provincial 
government, either directly, by administrative fiat, or indirectly, via economic policy and 
other measures designed to advance the economic development agenda (Buckley et al., 2006). 
Initially, ODI was permitted on a very selective basis. However, in recent years administrative 
controls have been relaxed, approval processes and procedures streamlined, and the ceiling 
raised on the amount of foreign exchange that can be committed to individual investment 
projects (Sauvant, 2006). The process of accelerated outward investment liberalisation and 
growth can be traced from Deng Xiaoping’s tour of South China in 1992 through to the 
government-led ‘go global’ (‘zou chu qu’) initiative, which was instigated in 1999. This 
initiative aims to promote the international competitiveness of Chinese firms by further 
reducing or eliminating foreign exchange-related, fiscal and administrative obstacles to 
international investment (Sauvant, 2006). In order to properly understand Chinese ODI, it is 
therefore important that formal empirical analysis takes full account of this changing 
institutional context and the idiosyncratic response by Chinese firms that it might engender. In 
other words, it is necessary to understand the extent to which the investment location 
decisions of Chinese MNEs, when considered in aggregate, are explicable by received theory 
or whether the context and institutional environment of the home country exerts a distinctive 
effect. Such distinctiveness might be a consequence of the continued pursuit of national 
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economic imperatives, for instance, with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) employed as an 
instrument of policy.  
The paper is organised as follows.  First, we review the general theory of FDI and 
discuss the extent to which it holds for an emerging economy like China, where central 
planning has influenced greatly the development of the external sector.  We do this by 
considering three potential arguments (namely capital market imperfections, special 
ownership advantages and institutional factors) for a special theory to be nested within the 
general theory.  We then describe a number of economic and policy variables proposed in the 
literature to have a significant influence on (industrialised country) FDI flows and hypothesise 
on their ability to explain Chinese ODI patterns. We go on to test the special theory in a 
model of Chinese ODI using official data on individual approved Chinese FDI projects. We 
find that Chinese ODI is indeed distinctive in certain respects that have implications for 
theory, particularly the finding for political risk, but that familiar explanations of FDI are 
relevant, too. We conclude by recommending and commenting on future research directions.  
  
The general theory of FDI 
The general principles of the theory of FDI are twofold (Buckley and Casson, 1976). They are 
that (1) firms internalise missing or imperfect external markets until the costs of further 
internalisation outweigh the benefits and (2) firms choose locations for their constituent 
activities that minimise the overall costs of their operations. Expansion by the internalisation 
of markets means that firms use FDI to replace imperfect external markets in intermediate 
products and knowledge (as exemplified by exporting and licensing) and appropriate the 
profits from so doing. In the case of emerging economy MNEs, there are likely to be 
particular imperfections in home country capital markets which may require special 
applications of the theory and this, as we shall see, is true of China. 
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The location aspect of the mainstream or general theory, as encapsulated in Dunning’s 
eclectic paradigm, suggests three primary motivations (Dunning, 1977, 1993): 
 
1. Foreign market seeking FDI 
2. Efficiency (cost reduction) seeking FDI  
3. Resource seeking FDI (including a subset that is known as strategic-asset seeking FDI) 
 
The general theory of FDI has been built largely on the experience of industrialised country 
investors. While in certain respects this can be readily applied to emerging economy investors, 
there are inevitably gaps. Here, we look critically at the applicability of the general theory. 
Market seeking FDI will be undertaken by emerging economy firms for traditional trade 
supporting reasons – to access distribution networks, to facilitate the exports of domestic 
producers and to enhance exports from the host country to other large and rapidly growing 
markets. Efficiency seeking FDI will occur when outward investors seek lower cost locations 
for operations, in particular in the search for lower cost labour. Given China’s comparatively 
low labour cost levels this motivation is unlikely and is not explicitly considered here. 
Resource seeking FDI from emerging economies occurs to acquire or secure the supply of 
raw materials and energy sources in short supply at home. This may well involve Chinese 
ODI in relatively high income countries that have significant energy reserves and raw 
material deposits (e.g. Australia and Canada). It may also involve the search for specific 
assets such as R&D capacity and output, design facilities and brand names that are embedded 
in advanced country firms and which can usually only be accessed by takeover of these firms 
or subdivisions of them (Dunning, 2001). 
Various studies also identify an incremental or stages process to firm 
internationalisation that is linked to geographic and psychic distance (e.g. Johanson and 
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Vahlne, 1977), with firms beginning their international operations in locations geographically 
close to the home market and in (psychically close) countries where knowledge, relationships 
and experience have already been established through prior trade business and other 
interactions. Examples of such behaviour are to be found in work on MNEs from Hong Kong 
(Lau, 1992, 2003), South Korea (Erramilli et al., 1999), India and Argentina in the 1980s 
(Ferrantino, 1992; Pradhan, 2003), Brazil (Villela, 1983) and Malaysia (Zin, 1999).  
 
A special theory for Chinese ODI? 
The question then arises as to whether FDI from emerging economies and, specifically, from 
China requires a special theory nested within the general theory above. There are three 
potential arguments: capital market imperfections, the special ownership advantages of 
Chinese MNEs and institutional factors. 
 
1. Capital market imperfections 
Capital market imperfections in emerging economies such as China may require a special 
application of the general theory. Such imperfections may mean that capital is available at 
below market rates for a considerable period of time, creating a semi-permanent 
disequilibrium in the capital market which (potential) outward investors can exploit. In this 
sense, market imperfections may be transformed into ownership advantages by emerging 
economy firms (Buckley, 2004a). This ability may arise from a number of particular and 
inter-related imperfections: 
 
(i) State-owned (and state-associated) firms may have capital made available to them at 
below market rates (e.g. in the form of soft budget constraints) (e.g. Lardy, 1998; 
Warner et al., 2004; Scott, 2002); 
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(ii) inefficient banking systems may make soft loans to potential outward investors, either as 
policy or through inefficiency (e.g. Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Warner et al., 2004; 
Antkiewicz and Whalley, 2006); 
(iii) conglomerate firms may operate an inefficient internal capital market that effectively 
subsidises FDI (e.g. Liu, 2006 on the diversified Chinese conglomerate, Haier); and 
(iv) family-owned firms may have access to cheap capital from family members (e.g. 
Erdener and Shapiro, 2005; Tsai, 2002; Child and Pleister, 2003). 
There are good grounds for believing that all four of these imperfections exist in China. State-
sponsored soft budget constraints make acquisition by Chinese enterprises a ‘normal’ mode of 
entering and penetrating a host economy (Warner et al., 2004). Over-bidding by Chinese 
MNEs is attributed to the absence of private shareholders and sanguine views of the 
associated technical, commercial and political risks, to limited fear of failure, close 
government support and low cost of capital (Ma and Andrews-Speed, 2006).3 Indeed, the 
survival of inefficient Chinese firms in general is attributed to the pervasive nature of soft 
budget constraints promoted by local government and party officials, resulting in the inability 
of banks and other financial institutions to impose either restructuring or exit on firms (Lardy, 
1998). The “sizeable venture capital” afforded to state-owned enterprise is exemplified by the 
State Council’s provision to the China International Trust And Investment Corporation 
(CITIC) when it was instructed to explore overseas investment opportunities in priority 
resource sectors (Zhang, 2003). The State Council also directed the transfer of the China 
Investment and Trust Corporation for Foreign Economic Cooperation and Trade (FOTIC, 
previously the financial arm of MOFTEC) to the Sinochem Group, effectively giving it an 
‘internal bank’ (Zhang, 2003), while the Beijing steel producer, Shougang Group, was granted 
the right to start and own a bank, virtually guaranteeing the lifting of a hard budget constraint 
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(Steinfeld, 1998). The acquisition of IBM’s personal computer business by Lenovo 
(concluded in 2005) was generally regarded to have been underwritten by the Chinese 
government, who at the time held a stake of 57 per cent in the company (Business Week, 
2004). From this discussion, it appears possible that capital market imperfections may account 
for the ease with which both natural resource seeking FDI (typically in energy and raw 
materials sectors) and strategic asset seeking FDI might be undertaken by Chinese MNEs. 
Imperfections in the capital market would become evident if Chinese MNEs had a 
distinctive foreign investment strategy in terms of location, as exemplified by a perverse 
reaction to risk and return not predicted by studies on the FDI motivations of industrialised 
country firms. In the current study, we test for this by including political risk in our 
determinants of Chinese ODI after controlling for the risk premium, which is proxied by 
market size and market growth.  
 
2. Ownership advantages of Chinese MNEs 
There is an argument that emerging economy MNEs have developed ownership advantages 
that allow them to operate certain types of activity in foreign countries more effectively than 
local firms and industrialised country MNEs. These advantages may include flexibility (Wells 
1980), economising on the use of capital (or resources), benefits accruing from home country 
embeddedness (i.e. prior familiarity of operating within an emerging market context) and the 
ability to engage in beneficial relations with firms and other actors in order to provide access 
to resources controlled by others. The latter advantage, which some term a relational asset 
(Dunning, 2002; Erdener and Shapiro, 2005), may be revealed as networking skills and may 
be linked to the Chinese diaspora in the case of Chinese firms.4 Where these conditions are 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3 Although it post dates the time frame of the current study, the establishment of a special state fund (valued by 
some at around USD15bn) available to qualifying Chinese firms for the acquisition of foreign brands and 
companies underscores these points (Swystun et al., 2005). 
4 We are grateful to one of the reviewers for this point.  
 9
relatively long lasting then they provide the case for semi-permanent ‘ownership advantages’ 
of emerging economy MNEs; the third element of Dunning’s eclectic theory after 
internalisation and location factors (Dunning, 1993). This argument is less easy to test using 
aggregate FDI data, however.  
Extant theory asserts that the early investments of firms frequently occur in countries with 
similar cultural background to the home country (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) or where 
relational assets in the form of ethnic or familial ties with a specific minority population in the 
host country can be exploited (Lau, 2003; Wells, 1983; Lecraw 1977). Within such a network, 
market information about the most suitable and profitable investment opportunities can 
circulate with ease, and fruitful commercial relationships can be established that facilitate 
market entry and development. Investment and commercial risk can be reduced as a 
consequence (Lecraw, 1977; Zhan, 1995). The importance of networking skills as a special 
ownership advantage of Chinese firms would be evident if Chinese ODI was associated 
positively with host countries that are endowed with relevant location-specific relational 
advantages, such as the presence of an appreciable ethnic Chinese population. 
 
3. Institutional factors influencing Chinese ODI 
The institutional fabric of an emerging economy can determine the ability and will of 
domestic firms to invest abroad. A straightforward, consistent and liberal policy towards 
outward FDI will encourage it, while a discretionary and frequently adjusted policy may do 
the opposite. There is an emerging body of theoretical work that concerns the institution-
based view of strategy, or institutional theory for short (North, 1990; Meyer and Nguyen, 
2005; Peng, 2002; Wright et al., 2005). This has the potential to help explain distinctiveness 
in the behaviour of outward investing Chinese firms. The basic thrust of this contribution is 
that firms’ strategy is shaped by the home institutional environment (more colloquially “the 
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rules of the game”) which is formally and informally enforced by government and its agents 
(Scott, 2002) and which bear upon the norms and cognitions that influence investment, 
including foreign investment, behaviour. High levels of government support, typically in the 
form of privileged access to raw materials and other inputs, low cost capital (discussed above), 
subsidies and other benefits help emerging country firms to offset ownership and location 
disadvantages abroad (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990). On the other hand, such investors also 
often encounter highly bureaucratic and burdensome administrative FDI approval procedures 
as government, at various levels, seek to influence the amount, direction, and scope of 
outward capital flows. If this is combined with discriminatory policy tools against certain 
industries and ownership forms, flows of ODI can be distorted. In such instances, FDI via 
informal or illegal routes may occur (or indeed be tacitly encouraged). 
 
************************* 
Tables 1 and 2 around here 
************************* 
 
Given the extent of state control of the Chinese economy (Scott, 2002), the 
institutional environment is likely to have had far-reaching and profound effects on the 
internationalisation decision of Chinese firms. Key periods in the evolution of China’s FDI 
approval process are presented in Table 1. Because various agencies within the state 
administration have been required to approve each and every outward FDI project from China 
(predominantly through the control of foreign exchange), this evolution is likely to have 
influenced strongly the development, strength and orientation of Chinese MNEs. To illustrate, 
extant research portrays Chinese ODI of the 1980s and early 1990s as having been directed by 
government towards supporting the export function of state-owned manufacturers; towards 
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providing stability to the supply of domestically scarce natural resources and towards the 
acquisition of information and learning on how to operate at an international level (Ye, 1992; 
Lu, 2002; Zhan, 1995). In particular, FDI in the energy and minerals sectors was encouraged 
to meet growing needs at home (Lawrence, 2002). In this sense, China has ‘built’ some of its 
MNEs, as did Singapore, South Korea and Malaysia (Wang, 2002; Dicken, 2003; Yeung, 
1998; Heenan and Keegan, 1979). Foreign direct investment, and especially natural resources-
orientated FDI, was concentrated by value in the developed countries (Buckley et al., 2006) 
(see Table 2). There is some evidence that latterly Chinese MNEs have internationalised to 
gain better access to foreign proprietary technology, strategic assets and capabilities (brands, 
distribution channels, foreign capital markets and so forth), often by acquisition; to exploit 
new markets and to diversify business activities in a manner that seeks to improve their 
international competitiveness (Taylor, 2002; Deng, 2003; Zhang, 2003, Buckley et al., 2006). 
This development, which has occurred in conjunction with increasing policy openness and 
liberalisation over the period under study (Sauvant, 2006), has seen Chinese ODI dispersed 
more widely, especially among the developing countries (see Table 2), with both defensive 
(import-substituting and quota-hopping) and offensive (developing new markets) market-
seeking FDI increasingly undertaken (Buckley et al., 2006). This is in addition to the 
continuance of natural-resources orientated FDI, which now increasingly encompasses 
developing countries. The promotion of exports and export-oriented FDI also continues. For 
example, direct government support in the form of export tax rebates, foreign exchange 
assistance and financial support was introduced in 1999 to foster FDI in trade-related 
activities and to promote Chinese exports, especially in the textiles, machinery and electrical 
equipment sectors (Wong and Chan, 2003). The effect of home country institutions on the 
investment behaviour of Chinese MNEs would be evidenced by a correlation between a key 
policy change and a change in the amount or distribution of Chinese ODI, or both. 
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The Determinants of Chinese ODI - Hypotheses  
We now review the determinants of FDI derived from theory and hypothesise on their ability 
to influence the distribution of Chinese ODI. 
 
Market seeking FDI 
Host market characteristics, such as market size, are generally recognised as a significant 
determinant of FDI flows: as markets increase in size, so do opportunities for the efficient 
utilisation of resources and the exploitation of economies of scale and scope via FDI 
(UNCTAD, 1998). Numerous studies (surveyed by Chakrabarti, 2001) show that FDI flow 
and market size are associated positively. Recent work points to the rise of offensive market-
seeking motives driving Chinese MNEs (Buckley et al., 2006; Deng, 2004; Taylor, 2002; 
Zhang, 2003) and that this activity may increasingly be directed towards large markets.  
Theory suggests that market-oriented, horizontal FDI will be associated positively with 
growth in demand.  The market growth hypothesis holds that rapidly growing economies 
present more opportunities for generating profits than those which are growing more slowly 
or not at all (Lim, 1983). We therefore derive the following three hypotheses: 
 
H1a: Chinese ODI is associated positively with absolute host market size; 
H1b: Chinese ODI is associated positively with host market size per capita; 
H1c: Chinese ODI is associated positively with host market growth. 
 
Natural resource endowment 
The Chinese government has used ODI to ensure the supply of domestically-scarce factor 
inputs as the Chinese economy has grown (Ye, 1992; Zhan, 1995). Key sectors include 
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minerals, petroleum, timber, fishery and agricultural products (Wu and Sia, 2002; Cai, 1999). 
Purchases of stakes in Australian mineral and food companies by CITIC and the acquisition 
of Canada-based PetroKaz by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) are examples 
(Wu and Sia, 2002). Internalisation theory asserts the importance of equity-based control in 
the exploitation of scarce natural resources and so a positive association between the natural 
resources endowment of countries and Chinese ODI is expected (Buckley and Casson, 1976). 
Thus: 
 
H2:  Chinese ODI is associated positively with host country endowments of natural resources. 
 
Asset-seeking FDI 
Chinese ODI has been directed to the acquisition of information and knowledge on how to 
operate internationally, especially in the 1980s (Buckley, et al., 2006; Ye, 1992; Zhan, 1995). 
In recent years, an expressed goal of state-directed Chinese ODI has been to access advanced 
proprietary technology, immobile strategic assets (e.g. brands, local distribution networks) 
and other capabilities abroad (Warner et al., 2004; Taylor, 2002; Deng, 2003; Zhang, 2003), 
through both greenfield entry and acquisition. It is expected that Chinese MNEs would direct 
such asset-seeking ODI towards economies with significant levels of human and intellectual 
capital, in particular the industrialised countries, to help them to strengthen their 
competitiveness elsewhere (Dunning et al., 1998; Dunning, 2006). It is worth noting that 
many acquisitions by Chinese firms, especially in Europe and the USA, have involved a target 
company that was ailing or insolvent. Proprietary ownership advantage endowments can be 
proxied by the rate of patenting in the host country. Thus: 
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Internalisation theory predicts that in countries experiencing high political risk, market-
oriented firms will tend to substitute arm’s length servicing modes (exporting or licensing) for 
directly owned local production, and that resources-oriented firms are discouraged from 
committing substantial sunk costs in the form of FDI projects (Buckley and Casson, 1981, 
1999). Thus, high political risk is generally associated with low values of FDI inflow, ceteris 
paribus (Chakrabarti, 2001). The use of a risk index on its own would beg the question of the 
return on investment. If higher risk host countries also offer higher returns, then FDI will still 
flow to them, and an increasing relationship between risk and FDI will be observed. In this 
study, the role of returns is approximated (as it is in many studies on country risk) by market-
related variables, so we can argue that returns of a market-related nature have been controlled 
for. Similarly, the scope for returns on Chinese investment in natural resources (the most 
likely motive for investment in risky countries of Central Asia and Africa) is controlled for by 
the natural resources variable. Because the measure of political risk we use assigns higher 
values to greater political stability, the general theory of FDI would predict a positive 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Thus: 
 
H4: Chinese ODI is associated negatively with rising levels of host country political risk. 
 
Cultural proximity 
The Chinese diaspora is acknowledged to have contributed to the integration of China into the 
world economy since 1979, especially in positively influencing inbound FDI from Singapore, 
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the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Hong Kong (Henley et al., 1999; Ng and Tuan, 2002; 
Yeung, 1999; Sikorski and Menkhoff, 2000). 5  Strong economic connections amongst 
overseas Chinese and the importance of ‘guanxi’ (the ancient system of personal relationships 
and social connections based on mutual interest and benefit) in Chinese business dealings 
may also influence patterns of Chinese ODI (Standifird and Marshall, 2000; Luo, 1997; Tong, 
2003). A number of scholars argue that ethnic and family ‘guanxi’ networks constitute a firm-
specific advantage for Chinese MNEs because these help to reduce the business risk and 
transaction costs (Sung, 1996; Braeutigam, 2003; Erdener and Shapiro, 2005) associated with 
the identification of business opportunities in certain foreign markets (Zhan, 1995). These 
networks may also compensate Chinese MNEs for their relatively late entry into international 
markets (Li, 2003).  
This argument suggests that Chinese firms will invest in countries with a large 
resident population of ethnic Chinese. Such countries are mostly to be found in Asia, which 
accounts for some 88 per cent of all ethnic Chinese living outside of China. In 1990, there 
were about 37 million overseas Chinese, with the majority (66 per cent) distributed more or 
less evenly among Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong SAR and Malaysia. A further eight per 
cent lived in North and South American countries, two per cent in European countries and one 
per cent each in Oceania and on the African continent (Poston et al., 1994). Thus: 
 




                                                          
5 Overseas Chinese are defined by Poston et al. (1994: 633) as “all Chinese living outside mainland China and 
Taiwan, including Huaqiao (Chinese citizens residing abroad), Huaren (naturalized citizens of Chinese descent) 
and Huayi (descendents of Chinese parents)”.  
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From the discussion above, it is clear that policies on international capital transfers are likely 
to have influenced greatly patterns and trends in Chinese ODI. Although it is important for 
completeness that any formal model of Chinese ODI incorporate a policy dimension, lack of 
transparency in the application of regulations and incentive policies experienced by investors 
(Wong and Chan, 2003) makes this a difficult aspect to capture. Deng Xiaoping’s South 
China Tour in 1992 was associated with significant domestic market liberalisation. In 
response to this, numerous sub-national level authorities allowed enterprises under their 
supervision to internationalise, especially towards Hong Kong SAR, in order to engage in real 
estate and stock market speculation (Wong and Chan, 2003). Therefore, to investigate the role 
of institutional liberalisation towards ODI, we introduce a time dummy for 1992. Thus: 
 
H6:  Liberalisation of Chinese FDI policy in 1992 increased Chinese ODI. 
 
We control for a number of conventional variables from standard theory to specify correctly 
the estimated equation, and so to reveal the effects of the main variables, including those to 
test the special theory applied to Chinese ODI.  
 
Exchange rate 
A low or undervalued exchange rate encourages exports but discourages outward FDI 
(Kohlhagen, 1977; Logue and Willet, 1977; Stevens, 1993). As the home country exchange 
rate appreciates, more profitable opportunities for outward FDI will occur as foreign currency 
denominated assets become cheaper. It is possible that a rapid appreciation of the exchange 
rate, from a low or undervalued position, will more than proportionately increase outward 
FDI. For this reason, the exchange rate is included as a control variable. An appreciation of 
the home country’s currency vis-à-vis other countries should increase ODI into these 
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countries as it is effectively a depreciation in the host country’s currency (Clegg and Scott-
Green, 1999). In the case of China, the yuan Renminbi (RMB) was de facto pegged to the US 
dollar at a constant nominal level over the period under study (Roberts and Tyers, 2003; Hall, 
2004). However, the RMB peg against the US dollar allowed for revaluation of the yuan 
RMB against other currencies so that the real effective exchange rate of the yuan RMB 
appreciated by more than 20 per cent between 1995 and 2002 (Hall, 2004). Thus: 
 
H7: A relative depreciation of the host country’s currency leads to an increase in Chinese ODI. 
 
Host inflation rate   
Volatile and unpredictable inflation rates in a host country discourages market-seeking FDI 
by creating uncertainty and by making long term corporate planning problematic, especially 
in respect of price-setting and profit expectations. High rates of inflation may also lead to 
domestic currency devaluation, which in turn reduces the real value of earnings in local 
currency for market-seeking inward investing firms. High inflation rates tend to check the 
export performance of domestic and foreign investors and thereby discourage export-oriented 
FDI by increasing the prices of locally sourced inputs, making it harder to maintain a cost 
advantage in third markets. We therefore expect a negative relationship between Chinese ODI 
and host country inflation. Thus: 
 
H8: Chinese ODI is associated negatively with host country inflation rates. 
 
Exports and imports 
Exports from China proxy the intensity of trade relations between home and host country by 
capturing the market-seeking motive of Chinese firms. During the 1980s and early 1990s, 
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much Chinese ODI took place to provide a local support function for domestic Chinese 
exporters and to help them increase their hard currency earnings (Wu and Sia, 2002). 
Typically, such investments were small scale, with local subsidiaries providing information, 
international trade, transportation and financial services to their Chinese principals and other 
Chinese firms (Ye, 1992; Zhan, 1995). In some cases, these were vanguard operations for 
later and more substantial investment. Thus: 
 
H9: Chinese ODI is associated positively with Chinese exports to the host country. 
 
Imports to a home country from a host country also capture the intensity of trade relations. 
Since they are an indication of the importance of the resources transferred we would expect 
home country firms to internalise these strategic flows using outward FDI as the key 
mechanism (Buckley and Casson, 1976).  Thus: 
 
H10: Chinese ODI is associated positively with Chinese imports from the host country. 
 
Geographic distance from China 
Internalisation theory predicts that market-seeking firms are more likely to serve 
geographically proximate countries through exports and more distant markets via FDI 
(Buckley and Casson, 1981). This suggests a substitution of FDI for other modes as distance 
increases. However, our dependent variable is in the form of the annual flow of Chinese FDI 
alone (i.e. not in the form of a ratio with exports). As we predict the flow of FDI to be greatest 
to nearby countries, so we would expect to capture a negative effect of distance on the flow of 
FDI (Loungani et al., 2002). A physical distance variable is therefore needed to complement 
our cultural proximity variable, to isolate its effect. We incorporate distance as a control, thus:  
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H11: Chinese ODI is associated negatively with geographic distance from China.  
 
Openness to FDI 
The more open a country is to international investment, the more attractive it is likely to be as 
a destination for FDI (Chakrabarti, 2001). We include openness to FDI in our investigation, as 
a control: 
H12:  Chinese ODI is associated positively with the degree of openness of the host economy 
to international investment. 
 
Our hypotheses, their theoretical justification, the proxies we use and the expected signs are 
detailed in Table 3, together with our data sources. We expect the distinctive nature of the 
factors influencing Chinese ODI to be captured by the collective significance in the main 
variables that we identify in the table.  
 
************************* 
Table 3 around here 
************************* 
The Model 
Our discussion suggests the following log-linear model (Equation 1): 
 
LFDI  = α + β1LGDP +β2LGDPP +β3LGGDP + β4LORE +β5LPATENT + β6LPOLI  
  +β7CP + β8TD92 + β9LERATE + β10LINF + β11LEXP + β12LIMP + 




The data are transformed into natural logarithms as we expect non-linearities in the 
relationships on the basis of theory and previous empirical work. 
 
Data and Method 
Our dependent variable is the total amount of foreign exchange approved by SAFE during the 
project investment process. This includes pre-approved re-invested earnings and intra-
company loans, plus in-kind investment up to the total authorised value of a given project, in 
addition to equity capital.6 Forty nine countries are host to Chinese ODI in our dataset, 
twenty-two of which are members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and twenty seven which are not (see Appendix One).  
Two statistical models were used to estimate equation (1): pooled ordinary least 
squares (POLS) and the random effects (RE) generalised least squares method. A fixed effects 
(FEs) model cannot be used since equation (1) includes a time dummy variable. A Lagrangian 
multiplier (LM) test was conducted to identify whether POLS or REs furnished the better 
model. A value for the LM test that is significantly different from zero means that REs 
estimation is preferable to that of POLS.  
To investigate heterogeneity within the data we employ a structural break framework. 
First, we investigate the impact of significant changes in the policy regime dating from 1992. 
These changes might influence the decision making of investors across all the variables. 
Therefore, we divide the period into the two phases: 1984-1991 and 1992-2001. Second, and 
as our discussion above has indicated, China’s preference to invest in developing countries 
may indicate a different model of investment behaviour arising from state policy. To 
investigate this possibility we draw a distinction between developed and developing hosts 
using their OECD membership status. 
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Results and Discussion 
In preliminary regressions, two of the three alternative measures of host market size (growth 
in GDP and GDP per capita) never attained significance and were therefore not included in 
the final specification, which is reported in Table 6. The absolute host market size variable is 
retained to capture the market seeking motive (H1a) and to act as a control (for market returns) 
in the estimation of the relationship between Chinese ODI and host country risk. The 
empirical results obtained from the POLS and the REs equations are similar. However, the 
large and significant LM value indicates in favour of the REs and therefore only the results 
from REs are discussed.  Tables 4 and 5 present the correlation matrix and variance inflation 
factor (VIF) test results, which indicate that there are no general problems with the data. 
************************* 
Tables 4 and 5 around here 
************************* 
We first discuss the results of the REs model for the main variables (column 2, Table 
6). We find that host market characteristics (measured by absolute size of economy, LGDP); 
cultural proximity (CP) and policy liberalisation (TD92) are all significant and correctly 
signed. These findings support hypotheses H1a, H5 and H6. By contrast, political risk 
(LPOLI) is found to be significant but with a sign contrary to expectation as predicted in 
hypothesis H4. We find that natural resource endowments (LORE) and asset-seeking FDI 
(LPATENT) are both insignificant. Therefore, hypotheses H2 and H3 are not supported. We 
now discuss in more detail each of these main findings. 
************************* 
Table 6 around here 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
6 This also reflects the regulatory framework of Chinese ODI over the majority of the period under study. Until 
quite recently, Chinese firms were obliged to repatriate overseas earnings to financial authorities at home, while 
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************************* 
Absolute host market size (LGDP) has a positive influence on Chinese FDI outflows, 
with a one per cent rise in the variable increasing Chinese ODI by 0.35 per cent. This 
indicates that market-seeking was a key motive for Chinese ODI in the period under study 
(H1a). Cultural proximity (CP) is found to have a highly significant and positive effect on 
Chinese ODI (H5). This result suggests that the presence of ethnic Chinese people in the host 
country has promoted inward investment by Chinese firms. The policy liberalisation variable 
(TD92) is also positive and significant. This supports the argument that the qualitative 
changes in Chinese policy that took place in 1992, the year of Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the 
southern provinces, did mark a significant step towards liberalisation in a number of ODI-
related areas, and positively influenced the value of approved Chinese ODI for that year (H6). 
Our interpretation is that policy changes freed state-owned enterprises to invest abroad for 
reasons other than the promotion of exports, i.e. they were able to service foreign markets 
directly.   
A major finding is that the coefficient on the index of political risk (LPOLI) indicates 
an increasing relationship between host country political risk levels and Chinese ODI. We 
find that a 1 per cent increase in the host country risk index (that is, a decrease in risk) is 
associated with a decrease in Chinese ODI of 1.8 per cent. Thus we find no evidence to 
support Hypothesis 4. This runs counter to the normal findings for this variable and requires 
discussion. In line with theory advanced in this paper, capital market imperfections and 
institutional factors in China may have induced a perverse attitude to risk which contrasts 
with that found among industrialised country firms. In other words, Chinese foreign investors 
seem not to perceive risk in the same way as industrialised country firms. There are a number 
of reasons why Chinese firms may not behave in the conventional manner. First, Chinese 
state-owned firms may not be profit-maximisers, or may be maximising subject to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the ability to make inter-company loans was highly restricted under China’s foreign exchange controls. 
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government-led institutional influences. Second, the bulk of Chinese FDI is in developing 
countries (see Table 2) and these are precisely the countries that, as a group, record higher 
levels of political risk. Much of this investment may have been promoted by political 
affiliations and connections between China and the developing host country government 
concerned. The bargaining position of the Chinese government and Chinese firms may have 
been further strengthened vis-à-vis governments in those host countries that attract only 
modest amounts of investment from the industrialised nations. Third, China’s political and 
ideological heritage in the modern era may have led to Chinese ODI being preferentially 
directed to fellow communist or ideologically similar countries, many of which also record 
higher levels of political risk. Fourth, home country embeddedness (that is, in the current 
context, the knowledge of operating in an emerging country environment characterised by 
tight, centralised economic planning) may have provided Chinese firms with ownership 
advantages that enable them to mitigate the risk associated with operating in equivalent 
environments abroad. Fifth, Chinese firms may also be prepared to invest in countries 
generally avoided by industrialised country firms for ethical (e.g. human rights) reasons, with 
Sudan being an example. Sixth, we should finally note that the relative inexperience of some 
Chinese firms concerning the establishment and management of large-scale operations abroad 
may have led to FDI projects being undertaken with insufficient due diligence and attention to 
associated risks (Wong and Chan, 2003; Ma and Andrews-Speed, 2006). Our finding for risk 
also highlights potential shortcomings in familiar measures of political risk, which are 
typically calculated from the point of view of industrialised country firms (World Bank, 2006). 
Such indices may need to be recalculated to better capture the perceptions of firms from 
emerging economies like China. Given that our regression specification controls for market 
returns, it does appear that Chinese behaviour towards conventionally-measured host political 
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risk differs from that of developed country investors. In line with the theory put forward 
earlier, the evidence suggests that capital market imperfections play a role.  
Of the main variables we examine, we find no support for Hypothesis 3. The asset-
seeking variable (LPATENT) in the REs model is insignificant, which suggests that Chinese 
firms have not been motivated to acquire strategic intellectual capital assets over the period 
under study.  
We now discuss the results for our six control variables. The finding for exports 
(LEXP) is significant and correctly signed, supporting hypothesis H9. By contrast, we find 
that inflation (LINF) and imports (LIMP) are significant but with signs contrary to 
expectation as predicted in hypotheses H8 and H10. Our findings for the exchange rate 
(LERATE), geographic distance (LDIS) and market openness (LINFDI) are all insignificant. 
In short, we find no support for hypotheses H7, H11 and H12.  
The two trade-related variables, LEXP and LIMP, when viewed together, indicate that 
Chinese ODI has both a conventional and an idiosyncratic nature. As expected, LEXP 
positively affects FDI, which is the conventional finding that FDI follows exports. It also 
supports the market seeking motive (H9). This finding concurs with the view that one of the 
key motivations of Chinese investment has been to promote domestic exports. We find that 
LIMP is also a significant determinant of Chinese ODI but, against expectations (H10), has a 
negative effect. A 1 per cent increase in China’s imports from a host country is associated 
with a 0.25 per cent reduction in Chinese ODI. This result could be generated by the practice 
of Chinese investors relocating production from China to other developing countries. In this 
account, imports of intermediate products to China for processing and re-export are reduced 
when Chinese firms relocate processing abroad via FDI. By value, most Chinese ODI is in the 
developing countries (see Table 2), and outward investment to these countries to circumvent 
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trade barriers in third markets may have been a motive. In essence, it is possible that some 
Chinese ODI substitutes for intermediate imports to China.  
The coefficient on inflation (LINF) is significant and positive, indicating that a 1 per 
cent increase in the variable is associated with an increase in Chinese ODI of 0.19 per cent. 
This is contrary to expectation (H8). Such an association might suggest that countries with 
moderate demand inflation are more attractive to Chinese investors. This link between the 
variables would be reasonable on the assumption that moderate demand inflation 
accompanies economic growth. It may also support the view that the investment decisions of 
Chinese firms are unusually tolerant of less stable countries with respect to local economic 
conditions. This contrasts with the normal behaviour of profit maximising industrialised 
country firms, and again suggests that Chinese firms may be influenced strongly by home 
country capital market failure and institutional factors. 
 
Changes over time 
In order to investigate whether or not Chinese FDI has changed in character over the period in 
question, we divide our data into two time periods around 1992. This procedure is borne out 
by the results in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 which contrast sharply. These indicate that 
different locational determinants and motivations apply over time. Of our main variables, we 
find that market size (LGDP) and cultural proximity (CP) were important determinants of 
Chinese ODI for the period prior to 1991; in the later time period (post 1992), natural 
resource endowment (LORE), political risk (LPOLI), cultural proximity (CP) and policy 
liberalisation (TD92) are instead significant determinants. We also detect differences across 
time among the control variables. Before 1991, inflation (LINF), geographic distance (LDIS) 
and market openness (LINFDI) were important determinants of Chinese ODI, but post 1992 
only the two trade-related variables, exports (LEXP) and imports (LIMP), are significant. 
 26
These findings are in agreement with the earlier discussion that there has been a significant 
change in the foreign investment behaviour of Chinese enterprises over time and that this is at 
least partly due to the variable policy regime, as suggested by our finding for the policy 
liberalisation variable (TD92) which indicates a surge in ODI for the year 1992. Arguably, 
this provides further substantiation for the notion that institutional factors have influenced 
patterns of Chinese ODI. We find that, over the period under study, Chinese firms have 
moved away from undertaking mainly market seeking strategies in nearby foreign markets 
towards the securing of raw materials in riskier markets. These findings reinforce the view 
that the securement of natural resources has become an imperative in more recent years, in 
line with Chinese domestic growth, and that this investment has been directed to countries 
with higher levels of political risk (by western standards). The fact that LDIS is significant 
and negative for the earlier period but not for the latter one shows that geographic proximity 
of host countries to China was a positive influence only on early Chinese ODI. This 
development may be an outcome of the growing maturity of Chinese market-seeking 
investors and the increasing propensity for Chinese firms to engage in natural resources in 
more spatially distant markets. 
The highly significant and positive coefficient for cultural proximity (CP) in both time 
periods (columns 3 and 4) supports our hypothesis that familiarity between populations is 
important in the flow of Chinese FDI. The facilitating role of the Chinese diaspora persists 
throughout the period under study, as expected, and suggests that relational assets indeed 
constitute an ownership advantage for Chinese firms when they invest in countries with a 
significant Chinese population. In the latter period only, ODI is positively associated with 
Chinese exports, indicating that a significant part of FDI has followed export trade. These 
results are consistent with a ‘stages approach’ to internationalisation being applicable to 
Chinese ODI and further research is required.   
 27
 
Host country level of development 
Theory suggests that home country market imperfections can exert a significant impact on the 
decisions of foreign investors. It follows that Chinese government policy may have led to a 
distinctive pattern of outward FDI by host country. Here, we test this for developed and 
developing countries by comparing results for the sub-samples of OECD and non-OECD 
countries in columns (5) and (6) of Table 6, respectively. Looking at the main variables, we 
see that market size (LGDP) is a significant determinant of Chinese ODI within the OECD 
group; that is, Chinese investors preferentially seek out larger markets within the OECD 
countries. This is a conventional result, and captures that part of Chinese FDI that is market 
seeking. Also significant is the cultural proximity variable (CP). This variable appears to be 
capturing the tendency for Chinese firms to invest in OECD countries where a sizeable 
population of ethnic Chinese can be found. The highly significant and positive policy 
liberalisation variable for OECD countries alone (TD92 in column 5 of Table 6) again yields 
insight into the relatively undeveloped state of the FDI decision process by Chinese investors. 
The policy change in 1992 is associated with a large increase in FDI to the developed world. 
This implies that the decision to invest was previously tightly circumscribed by government, 
and this may be the reason why a full and conventional pattern of significance is not observed. 
However, the pattern of investment flows to the developed economies fits with Chinese 
government priorities during liberalisation. 
It is clear that Chinese ODI in non-OECD countries is not motivated by host market 
size, and that other motives must therefore be at play. Looking at the control variables, the 
positive significance of the LEXP variable applies to both OECD and non-OECD countries. 
This suggests that Chinese ODI follows trade for both categories of country. The strong result 
for LEXP captures FDI that follows Chinese exports and is an indicator of the role of host 
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market demand. As we would expect from the argument above concerning the mechanism 
through which the Chinese import variable (LIMP) associates with Chinese ODI, it is the non-
OECD group of hosts that records a negative effect. These results indicate that it is 
specifically those developing countries from which China imports least to which Chinese 
investors have been attracted. Inflation (LINF) is significant for OECD countries only. This 
suggests that moderate inflation is a characteristic of those buoyant markets that attracted 
Chinese firms.  
One of the most compelling earlier findings, that our main variable political risk 
(LPOLI) is significant, is lost in both equations (5) and (6). From this, we infer that, while 
Chinese ODI is associated with higher levels of host country political risk, the difference in 
risk in the data is primarily that between developed and developing countries, rather than 
within these two country groupings. The apparent preference for less-developed and risky 
host countries as against developed hosts is consistent with our argument on the lower cost of 
capital enjoyed by state-owned enterprises, as well as with the relatively unsophisticated 
country risk evaluation processes of Chinese investors. This result supports our theoretical 
contention that capital market imperfections in China have been crucial to outward FDI over 
the period in question. 
 
Conclusions  
This paper is one of the first attempts to formally model Chinese ODI. Our motivation is to 
test the extent to which the mainstream theory that explains industrialised country FDI is 
applicable to emerging country contexts and whether special explanations nested within the 
general theory are needed. We develop a theoretical framework that draws on this body of 
theory but which allows for both conventional and novel hypotheses to be tested. This is done 
within a well-specified model using previously unexamined official data on Chinese ODI and 
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by employing a wide range of main and control variables. We find that Chinese ODI has both 
a conventional and an idiosyncratic dimension.   
In terms of our main variables, we find a conventional result for market size. We infer 
from the significant role played by host country natural resource endowments that the 
institutional environment has strongly shaped Chinese ODI, leading to significant natural-
resources seeking FDI. We also find that policy liberalisation has had a positive influence in 
stimulating Chinese ODI. This is further evidence of a distinctive explanation, to the effect 
that home country institutions have played a significant role in determining the flow and 
direction (OECD compared with non-OECD) of Chinese ODI. Viewed together, these 
findings are in agreement with the well publicized expansion of natural resources-seeking 
activities of Chinese MNEs in recent years, especially to the industrialised countries, in 
response primarily to domestic economic imperatives (Taylor 2002; Deng 2003, 2004). 
Although there are indications that Chinese firms have become increasingly acquisitive in 
recent years we find that, prior to 2001 (when our data ends), ODI was not driven by the 
motive to acquire strategic assets. Arguably, the asset-seeking hypothesis is more likely to be 
supported on data for more recent years; for example, as China’s ‘go global’ policy becomes 
fully implemented and acted upon by firms.  
Cultural proximity is found to be a significant factor, indicating that reduced 
transaction costs and network effects are important in attracting Chinese investors and that 
relational assets constitute a special ownership advantage, even for state-owned firms. This 
supports a role for reduced psychic distance in explaining Chinese ODI. When we examine 
differences over time, we find that market size, geographic proximity, inflation and market 
openness are important locational determinants for the period 1984 to 1991, with the distance 
variable suggesting that the Chinese diaspora and market familiarity have positively 
influenced the destination of earlier Chinese investment outflows. However, the finding that 
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the cultural proximity variable does not change over time suggests that Chinese ODI is still in 
an early stage of development and that more familiar cultures in host countries continue to 
help promote Chinese inward investment. These findings warrant further investigation on a 
longer time series of data. 
More challenging is the unprecedented finding that Chinese ODI is attracted, rather 
than deterred, by political risk (as measured conventionally and with market returns 
controlled for by market size). This suggests that Chinese firms do not perceive or behave 
towards risk in the same way as do industrialised country firms. In accordance with our theory, 
we attribute this to the low cost of capital that Chinese firms (for the most part SOEs) enjoy as 
a consequence of home country capital market imperfections. Indeed, state-ownership can be 
considered as a firm-specific advantage for many Chinese MNEs in this context (Ding, 2000). 
However, the experience of operating in a highly regulated and controlled domestic 
environment (i.e. home-country embeddedness) may also be relevant. This experience may 
have equipped Chinese MNEs with the special ownership advantages needed to be 
competitive in other emerging economies. Moreover, further augmentation of the ownership 
advantages of Chinese firms is likely to occur as Chinese MNEs become more experienced 
internationally (Deng, 2004) and as the Chinese government and its agencies continue to 
provide political, financial and other support, as inferred by our discussion of institution-
based theory. 
Our study of Chinese outward FDI offers the opportunity to examine how a country 
with distinctive home country institutions fits with the emerging body of theoretical work on 
the ‘institution-based view of strategy’. Chinese firms that invest abroad have to straddle 
environments, institutions and rules that differ probably more than for any other outward 
investing country in the world. In this paper, we have expected contrasts with the 
conventional model, and we have found evidence for these. Theorizing on the strategy of 
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firms, especially those from emerging countries, needs to pay greater attention to the 
influence of home country institutions. It is arguable that Chinese firms seek foreign 
investment opportunities in environments that resemble their home environment. Further, it is 
tenable that Chinese investors are unconstrained by the ethical and governance obligations 
that are normally expected of western MNEs today. If so, they may resemble outward 
investors from the West in an earlier period, and future changes in Chinese firms’ behaviour 
and location decisions can be envisaged, contingent upon the evolution of institutions and 
rules of the game at home. For the present, Chinese outward investors clearly present marked 
contrasts from the conventional model in key respects. 
There are implications of this research for our understanding of the outward FDI 
strategies of firms from other emerging markets, such as the other ‘BRICs’ (Brazil, Russia, 
and India). First, state direction over firms (whether formal or informal) is likely to generate a 
signature in the locational pattern of outward investment that would not be predicted by the 
general theory of FDI, which assumes that firms are profit maximisers. The second 
implication is that liberalisation is a very powerful instrument for emerging economies. This 
does not simply mean trade liberalisation, but includes the whole range of internal 
liberalisations possible for countries with a significant state sector or dominant (private or 
public) firms, or both. The behaviour of domestic firms changes dramatically once 
competition, or its prospect, is introduced. Firms that performed a social role, such as the 
SOEs, once divested of this, are able to seek growth. However, China remains distinctive 
from other emerging economies in that many of its MNEs remain in state hands, even though 
corporatised in order to focus on commercial objectives. State direction means that these 
firms still align their operations, whether at home or abroad, with the five-year plans and 
national imperatives. This is a model that is not replicated, in any general way, in any of the 
other leading emerging economies.  
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With respect to further work, an issue requiring investigation, possibly of a qualitative 
nature, is whether or not and how Chinese investors are influenced (as are industrialised 
country firms) by concerns of due diligence, risk evaluation and ethical considerations in host 
countries. Similarly, how patterns of FDI are affected by formal and informal political links 
between China and other countries (that is, the supranational institutional framework) also 
merits further examination.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Key Stages in Chinese ODI Policy Development 
1979-1985 Stage One: Cautious internationalisation 
With the ‘open-door’ policy, Chinese ODI was identified by government as one means of 
opening and integrating China into the world economy. Chinese state-owned firms start to set 
up their first international operations. Only state-owned trading corporations under MOFERT 
(later MOFCOM or the Ministry of Commerce) and provincial and municipal ‘economic and 
technological cooperation enterprises’ under the State Economic and Trade Commission (now 
part of the National Development and Reform Commission [NDRC]) are allowed to invest 
abroad. Some 189 projects were approved, amounting to about US$197mn in value. 
 
1986-1991 Stage Two: Government encouragement 
The government liberalised restrictive policies and allowed more enterprises to establish 
foreign affiliates, provided they had sufficient capital, technical and operational know-how 
and a suitable joint venture partner. Approval was granted to 891 projects, totalling some 
US$1.2bn. 
 
1992-1998 Stage Three: Expansion and Regulation 
Encouraged by domestic liberalisation, initiated by Deng Xiaoping’s journey to the South and 
the incorporation of enterprise internationalisation into the national economic development 
policy, sub-national level authorities actively promote the international business activities of 
enterprises under their supervision, especially in Hong Kong to engage in real estate and stock 
market speculation. The Asian crisis in 1997 and the subsequent collapse of some enterprises 
slow down this development. Latterly, concerns about loss of control over state assets, capital 
flight and ‘leakage’ of foreign exchange lead to a tightening of approval procedures, notably 
for projects of US$1mn or more.  Individual ODI project activity declines, despite an increase 
of total ODI of US$1.2bn in value terms.  
 
1999-2001 Stage Four: Implementation of the ‘go global’ policy 
Contradictory policies characterise this period. Further measures to control illicit capital 
transfers and to regularise ODI towards genuinely productive purposes are introduced.  By 
contrast, ODI in specific industries is actively encouraged with export tax rebates, foreign 
exchange assistance and direct financial support, notably in trade-related activities that 
promoted Chinese exports of raw materials, parts and machinery and in light industry sectors 
like textiles, machinery and electrical equipment. In 2001 this encouragement is formalised 
within the 10th five year plan which outlined the ‘going global’ or ‘zou chu qu’ directive. Total 
approved ODI rises by US$1.8bn, with an average project value of US$2.6mn. 
 
Since 2001 Stage Five: Post WTO period (included here for completeness) 
Heightened domestic competitive pressures, due to the opening of once protected industries 
and markets to foreign and domestic competitors, forces some Chinese firms to seek new 
markets abroad. In the 11th five-year plan the Chinese government stressed again the 
importance of ‘zou chu qu’ for Chinese firms and the Chinese economy. Although the 
approval system is decentralised and streamlined to become less burdensome, contradictory 
regulations still prevail. Direct, proactive support of ODI continues to be limited, mainly 
aimed at preventing illegal capital outflows and loss of control of state assets. 
 
 Sources:  Yu et al. (2005), Zhang (2003), Wong and Chan (2003), Wu and Chen (2001), Guo 




Table 2: Approved Chinese FDI Outflows, by Host Region and Economy, 1990-2003 
(10,000 US dollars and per cent) 
 
    Annual average of ODI stock (%) 
    1990-1992 1993-1995 1996-1998 1999-2001 2002-2003 
TOTAL CHINESE ODI (US$ 10,000) 133,847.53 176,010.77 235,466.77 377,761.70 1,038,208.76 
Percentage distribution by region:      
 DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 69.44 64.12 49.95 36.11 22.60 
  Western Europe 2.62 2.63 2.21 1.72 4.15 
   European Union (15 countries) 2.29 2.38 2.01 1.58 4.08 
   Other Western Europe (3 countries) 0.33 0.25 0.20 0.14 0.07 
  North America 41.59 39.86 31.25 23.67 12.82 
  Other developed countries 25.22 21.63 16.49 10.71 5.62 
 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 30.56 35.88 50.05 63.89 77.40 
  Africa 4.03 5.18 11.02 16.07 8.40 
   North  Africa (6 countries) 0.20 0.19 0.76 1.13 0.85 
   Other Africa (46 countries) 3.83 4.99 10.27 14.93 7.55 
  Latin America and the Caribbean 4.87 4.96 10.04 13.83 7.13 
   South America (12 countries) 3.64 3.19 8.40 8.89 4.18 
   
Other Latin America & Caribbean (18 
countries) 1.23 1.78 1.64 4.94 2.95 
  Central and Eastern Europe (18 countries) 4.17 5.76 4.85 4.44 4.62 
  Asia 16.61 18.71 22.22 27.87 56.60 
   West Asia (Middle East) (12 countries) 1.09 1.17 0.98 1.61 1.46 
   Central Asia (8 countries) 0.09 0.26 0.49 1.50 0.91 
   South, East and SE Asia (20 countries) 15.42 17.28 20.74 24.75 54.22 
  The Pacific (9 countries) 0.88 1.27 1.92 1.69 0.67 
Source: Calculated from MOFCOM Almanac of China’s Foreign Relations and Trade (various years) and China Commerce 
Yearbook 2004 (2004). 
Note: The total number of recipient countries per region is shown in the region heading. Regions are as per 





Table 3: The determinants of Chinese ODI 




Main or Control 
Variable 
Data source 
FDI (dependent variable)   Annual outflow of Chinese FDI (see text)    State Administration for 
Foreign Exchange 
Host market characteristics (I) – 
absolute market size (H1a)  
LGDP: Host country GDP + Market seeking Main World Bank Development 
Indicator 
Host market characteristics (II) – 
relative market size (H1b) 
LGDPP: Host country GDP per capita + Market seeking Alternative main 
(I) 
World Bank Development 
Indicator 
Host market characteristics (III) –
market growth (H1c) 
LGGDP: Annual percentage increase in GDP + Market seeking Alternative main 
(II) 
World Bank Development 
Indicator 
Natural resource endowment (H2) LORE:  the ratio of ore and metal exports to 
merchandise exports of host country 
+ Resource seeking Main World Bank Development 
Indicator 
Asset seeking FDI (H3) LPATENT: Total  (resident plus non-resident) 
annual patent registrations in host country 
+ Strategic asset seeking Main World Intellectual 
Property Organisation 
Political risk (H4) LPOLI: Host country’s political risk rating (higher 
values indicate greater stability) 
+ Transaction costs Main International Country Risk 
Guide 
Cultural proximity to China (H5) CP: = 1 when percentage of ethnic Chinese in total 
population is >1% 
+ Region-specific 
transaction costs 
Main Ohio University; Ma; 
Kent; United Nations 
Policy liberalisation (H6) TD92:Influence of Deng’s South China tour (1992) + Institutional factors Main  
Exchange rate (H7) LERATE: Host country official annual average 
exchange rate against RMB (fixed to dollar) 
+ Domestic currency 
price of foreign assets 
Control World Bank Development 
Indicator 
Host country inflation rate (H8) LINF: Host country annual inflation rate  - Macroeconomic 
conditions 
Control IMF – World Economic 
Outlook Database 
Exports (H9) LEXP: China’s exports to the host country  + Market seeking Control China Statistical Yearbook 
Imports (H10) LIMP: China’s imports from the host country + Trade Intensity Control China Statistical Yearbook 
Geographic distance from China 
(H11) 
LDIS: Geographic distance between host and home 
country (capital) 
- Spatial costs Control Calculated using 
www.geobytes.com 
Openness to FDI (H12) LINFDI: Ratio of inward FDI stock to host GDP + Investment policy Control UNCTAD FDI database 
Note: all monetary values are in constant (2000) US$ prices. 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
 
 LFDI LGDP LORE LPATENT LPOLI LERATE LINF LEXP LIMP LDIS LINFDI 
LFDI 1.0000           
LGDP 0.2188 1.0000          
LORE 0.0044 0.0274 1.0000         
LPATENT 0.0691 0.6684 0.1918 1.0000        
LPOLI -0.0432 0.4851 0.1789 0.4618 1.0000       
LERATE 0.0745 -0.2606 -0.1282 -0.2237 -0.2760 1.0000      
LINF -0.0019 -0.2879 0.1739 -0.1421 -0.4528 -0.0978 1.0000     
LEXP 0.4428 0.6565 -0.1286 0.3747 0.3516 0.0414 -0.3952 1.0000    
LIMP 0.3580 0.7282 0.0881 0.4587 0.4022 -0.1296 -0.3211 0.8545 1.0000   
LDIS -0.1767 -0.0368 0.2335 -0.0844 -0.0098 -0.3316 0.1982 -0.4947 -0.4217 1.0000  






Table 5: VIF test 
 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
    
LGDP 7.12 0.140471 
LORE 1.58 0.632445 
LPATENT 2.18 0.458703 
LPOLI 2.02 0.494854 
CP 2.17 0.459989 
TD92 1.05 0.948919 
LERATE 1.47 0.682196 
LINF 1.64 0.611576 
LEXP 6.61 0.151327 
LIMP 7.59 0.131727 
LDIS 2.89 0.345584 
LINFDI 2.43 0.410728 
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N 402 402 116 286 198 204 
LM Test χ2(1) = 15.43*** 
Adj R2  0.3642 0.6019 0.6142 0.6024 0.5763 0.6737 
Notes: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 




APPENDIX ONE: Countries host to Chinese ODI in the dataset. 
 
OECD countries Non-OECD countries 
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, United States 
Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, 
Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, 
Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South 
Africa, Sudan, Thailand, Ukraine, Venezuela 
 
